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The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the
Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution
I
Theorists of the common law have long proclaimed its unifying
and comprehensive qualities.' Coke took the position that any ju-
dicial decision was but an attempt to attain harmony with "the law,"
although any given precedent might be held to be contrary to "the
law" if it could be shown that the rule established by that precedent
had inconvenient consequences. 2 By the eighteenth century this con-
ception had become firmly rooted in our jurisprudence, as evidenced
by Blackstone's view of the common law as a fully matured and self-
sufficient legal system. 3 Later commentators detected a sort of in-
ternal dynamics of the common law, propelling courts and judges
inevitably toward correct solutions of the cases before them. 4 Thus,
traditional common law theory has resembled a sort of legal Platonism,
by which some ideal form of "the law," conceived of as a complete
entity,5 is deemed to exist in the heavens and to guide the decisions
of our earthly courts.
1. See Lincoln, The Relation of Judicial Decisions to the Law, 21 HARv. L. REV. 120
(1907).
2. See E. COKE, INSTITUTES *379a.
3. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '69, *70.
4. Fuller, for example, saw the law moving toward some central theory inherent in
the law itself. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940). Llcwellyn, in this same
vein, seemed to believe that the logic of the common law could make soltlions virtually
leap from difficult cases. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING
APP.ALS 178-99 (1960). Indeed, there is much in Anglo-American legal history that re-
gards the common law as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," Southern Pacific Co. v,
Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (dissenting opinion), despite Justice Holmes's disclaimer.
Holdsworth, after all, believed that the common law system owed its vitality to the
eighteenth century philosophy that "judicial decisions are but evidence of the law which
is sometimes misrepresented by a bad precedent." Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 8 (1936), citing Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 180 (1930).
This same philosophy found early expression in the United States Supreme Court when,
in the famous case of Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story declared:
In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are and
are not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by
the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective or ill.founded,
or otherwise incorrect.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
5. See Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 COLUm. L. Rav. 593 (1917).
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The various orthodox theories of the common law as a harmonious
and fully integrated legal system, however, generally have one con-
spicuous omission: a satisfactory account of the role of legislation.
In a system which owes its success to dispassionate reasoning by
analogy from prior judicial decisions, the element of legislation, con-
strained by neither reason nor disinterestedness, must necessarily be
regarded as foreign.
In 1908, Roscoe Pound was led to remark:
Not the least notable characteristics of American law today are
the excessive output of legislation in all our jurisdictions and
the indifference, if not contempt, with which that output is re-
garded by courts and lawyers. Text-writers who scrupulously
gather up from every remote corner the most obsolete decisions
and cite all of them, seldom cite any statutes except those land-
marks which have become a part of our American common law,
or, if they do refer to legislation, do so through the judicial
decisions which apply it. The courts, likewise, incline to ignore
important legislation .... 0
Pound's remarks echoed an earlier observation by Sir Francis Pollock
that there seemed to be no way to account for the rules of statutory
interpretation followed by the English courts of his day,
except on the theory that Parliament generally changes the law
for the worse, and that the business of the judge is to keep the
mischief of its interference within the narrowest possible bounds.
7
The orthodox view of Anglo-American jurisprudence has thus been
to regard statutes as aberrational departures from the orderly devel-
opment of the common law, rather than as sources of law to be
reasoned from and developed in the same manner as judicial
precedents.
In the present century, however, this orthodox view has been
heavily strained. Whole new areas of law have developed from statu-
tory origins, while in numerous other areas legislative enactment
has almost entirely displaced the common law.8 These developments
6. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1908).
7. F. POLLOcK, EsSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETICS 85 (1882). Sec also W. BlLCF r KON.
CoMmaErasrmuEs *70.
8. The areas of antitrust and labor relations are among the most familiar instances
in which a whole body of law has been built around legislation. In the commercial law
area, the Uniform Commercial Code, though in part the result of an effort to codify
common law principles, has served to displace those principles as independent sources
of law.
259
The Yale Law Journal
alone strongly suggest the necessity for a reappraisal of legislation's
role in the American legal system. In addition, two opinions de-
livered by Justice Harlan on June 15, 1970, in Welsh v. United
States9 and Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.'0 suggest that this
very process of reappraisal may have already begun.
II
In Moragne, Justice Harlan wrote for a unanimous Court and held
that the general maritime law incorporates a wrongful death action
for violations of the maritime duty of seaworthiness. 11 The reasoning
by which Justice Harlan reached this conclusion, rather than the
conclusion itself, is of particular interest here. To appreciate the
methodology he employed, the facts and surrounding circumstances
of the case must be thoroughly understood.
Moragne presented the Court with what can only be described as
an anomaly in the law. The petitioner was the widow of a long-
shoreman killed aboard a vessel in the coastal waters of Florida. In
a wrongful death action she alleged that her husband's death was
caused by the unseaworthiness 12 of the vessel on which he was work-
ing. The anomaly that the Court faced arose from the peculiar his-
tory of wrongful death recovery in admiralty. As in shoreside com-
mon law,13 there had traditionally been no right of recovery for wrong-
ful death in admiralty.14 By the time of Mrs. Moragne's action,
however, all fifty states had enacted wrongful death statutes". pat-
terned after Lord Campbell's Act.16 Yet, in admiralty the existence
of a statutory remedy for wrongful death was not always certain. The
Death on the High Seas Act,' 7 enacted in 1920, provided a right of
recovery for any death resulting from the breach of either the duty
of ordinary care or the duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel "occurring
9. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
10. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
11. Id. at 469.
12. Seaworthiness is a special maritime duty of care, stricter than the negligence
standard of ordinary care, and owed exclusively to seamen and longshoremen. See gen-
erally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 315-32 (1957).
13. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878). See generally 2 F. HAR1Elt & F. JAMls,
THE LAW OF TORTS 1284-85 (1956).
14. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 12,
at 302-03.
15. See Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 403
(1966).
16. 9 & 10 Vict., c.93 (1846).
17. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970).
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on the high seas beyond a marine league from shore."'' 8 Within a
marine league of the shore, however, recovery was usually dependent
on the wrongful death statute of the state in whose waters the acci-
dent had occurred.' 9 Since all such state statutes incorporate the neg-
ligence standard of ordinary care,20 death caused by a breach of that
duty occurring in state territorial waters would always give rise to
an action. Not all state wrongful death statutes, however, incorporate
the maritime duty of seaworthiness; hence the existence of a right to
recover for breach of that duty depends on which state is involved.
In wrongful death cases prior to Moragne, the applicable state wrong-
ful death statutes had all been found to incorporate the maritime duty
of seaworthiness.2 ' But, as was bound to happen, Mrs. Moragne as-
serted her claim under a statute which was found not to incorporate
that duty.22 The Florida Supreme Court had squarely held that the
state's wrongful death act incorporated only the duty to use ordinary
care.
Hence, the anomalous gap into which longshoreman Moragne fell:
If the accident had taken place outside the one marine league limit,
recovery would have been available under the Death on the High
Seas Act. If the accident had occurred within the coastal waters of an
adjoining state whose wrongful death statute incorporated the mari-
time duty of seaworthiness, recovery would again have been available.
If the accident had resulted from the breach of the duty to use ordi-
nary care, recovery could have been had under the Florida Act itself.
18. Although the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970), applies only
to death "caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default," id. at § 701, it has been construed
to provide a remedy for death resulting from either negligence or unseaworthiness. See,
e.g., Symonette Shipyards Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 903
(1966).
19. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1922). The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1970), provides a wrongful death remedy for seamen (but not for longshoremen)
in actions based upon negligence (but not upon unseaworthiness) in state territorial umters
and on the high seas (beyond one marine league from the shore).
20. See F. HARPER & F. JAms, supra note 13, at 1289.
21. See, e.g., Louisiana: Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc.. 412 F.2d
1011, 1024-29 (5th Cir. 1969); California: Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921, 926
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967); Puerto Rico: Compania Transatlantica
Espanola SA v. Melendez Torres, 358 F.2d 209, 213 (lst Cir. 1966); South Carolina: E. A.
Anthony v. International Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574, 578-79 (4th Cir. 1961); J'irginia: Holley
v. The Manfred Stansfield, 269 F.2d 317, 321 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Reederei
Blumenfeld, G.M.B.H. v. Holley, 361 U.S. 883 (1961); West 'irginia: Union Carbide Corp.
v. Goett v. Amherst Barge Co., 278 F.2d 319, 321 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826
(1960); Michigan: Hunter v. Dampsk A/S Flint v. Detroit Marine Tcrminals, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 701, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Oregon: Tallmon v. Toko Kaium K.K. Kobe, 278
F. Supp. 452, 456 (D. Ore. 1967); Maryland: Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torn, 245 F. Supp.
227, 230-31 (D. Md. 1965); New York: Clark v. Iceland 5.S. Co., 6 A.D.2d 544, 549, 179
N.Y.S.2d 708, 715 (1958).
22. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 167 (Fla. 1968).
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Finally, if Moragne's accident had resulted only in injury short of
death, he would have had a cause of action based on unseaworthiness
under general maritime law.23 Thus, no remedy was available for one
class, composed of seamen and longshoremen, whose deaths resulted
from a breach of the duty of seaworthiness in the waters of a state
whose wrongful death statute happened to not incorporate that
standard.
24
Facing such an anomaly, the Court might have based its decision on
either of two modes of analysis. First, the Court might have used
something like a traditional equal protection analysis, asking whether
such disparity of treatment was rationally related to the purpose of
compensating relatives of those wrongfully killed. Not surprisingly,
however, the Court did not take this route. The parties had not
conceived of the case in equal protection terms, nor did the Court
explicitly 'so view it.25 Second, the Court might have reconsidered
the admiralty rule denying a general wrongful death remedy-rooted
as such denial was in the old common law felony-merger doctrine 2 -
and found that rule to lack present justification in fact or reason. 7
While acknowledging the force of this second mode of analysis in
support of its holding,28 the Court was not content to rest its decision
solely upon it. It looked to the trend of legislative enactment for
additional guidance. It noted that every state had enacted a wrongful
death statute and that Congress had provided such actions for railroad
employees in the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2 for all seamen
in the Jones Act, and, indeed, for all persons killed on the high seas
23. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 12, at 315.
24. In fact, as the Florida Supreme Court noted, longshoreman Moragne probably
did have a remedy under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970), a federal maritime workmen's compensation act. Although
it is not clear, it appears that the petitioner waived this remedy and elected to pursue
her maritime "common law" claim for breach of the duty of seaworthiness. See Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1968). If Moragne had been a sea-
man rather than a longshoreman, however, this remedy, as well as all other statutory
remedies, would have been unavailable.
25. Although the Court did not explicitly view the case in equal protection terms,
the mode of analysis it used may ultimately have resembled that of equal protection.
See p. 277 infra.
26. By this ancient doctrine the negligent killing of another was both a tort and a
felony. The felony was regarded as more important, however, and was punishable by
death and forfeiture of all the felon's property to the Crown. With all the property thus
forfeited, nothing remained on which to base a civil suit. See E. POLLOCK, LAW Ov
ToRas 52-57 (Landon ed. 1951).
27. Quite apart from a general assault on the common law rule against recovery- for
wrongful death, the Court might have focused on the advisability of retaining the old
common law rule in admiralty. Indeed, it had once been held that the admiralty was free
to adopt its own rule respecting wrongful death recovery irrespective of the common law
rule. See, e.g., The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C.C. Md. 1865).
28. See 398 U.S. at 381-88.
29. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970).
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in the Death on the High Seas Act. Although none of these statutes
expressly offered petitioner any relief, the Court chose to read them
together, and in so doing, found in the whole something greater
than the sum of its parts:
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a
whole, make it clear that there is no present public policy against
allowing recovery for wrongful death. . . . This legislative es-
tablishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular
scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established
has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate
weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in
those of decisional law.30
Clarifying the presumption underlying its analysis, the Court went
on to state:
In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more
than the dimensions of the particular problem that came to the
attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that the legis-
lative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which
the mischief is identical. This conclusion is reinforced where
there exists not one enactment but a course of legislation dealing
with a series of situations, and where the generality of the under-
lying principle is attested by the legislation of other jurisdictions.31
By thus finding in a series of statutes a clear affirmative policy
favoring wrongful death recovery, the Court was persuaded to over-
turn its own prior judicially-created doctrine and to provide Mrs.
Moragne with a remedy.
The first observation to be made about the Court's reasoning is
that it flies directly in the face of a good deal of received learning
about common law judicial views of legislation.32 The second and more
important observation, however, is that Harlan's opinion for the Court
utilized a legal methodology which explicitly recognized the genera-
tive capacity of legislation.
III
In support of his methodology, Justice Harlan cited only four au-
thorities: law review articles by Roscoe Pound33 and James Landis,34
30. 898 U.S. at 390-91 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 892.
82. See p. 260 supra.
33. Pound, Comment on the Death Statutes-Applicability to Death in Admiralty, 13
NACCA LJ. 188 (1954).
84. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in I-LRvAR LECAL Fs& ys 213 (1934).
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dictum from a 1924 dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes,33 and a
1955 Supreme Court decision which offered only limited support for
the far-reaching methodology of the Court.30 Credit for the method-
ology of the Harlan opinion truly belongs to Pound and Landis. In
1908 Pound wrote a seminal article,3 7 attacking the shortsightedness
of the orthodox common law view of legislation, tracing its origins
to certain political and intellectual developments of the nineteenth
century, and essentially arguing for its abandonment. Pound's classic
presentation drew little attention until the constitutional crisis of the
1930's when Landis wrote his landmark essay, "Statutes and the
Sources of Law." 38 These two articles noted that the common law's
refusal to regard statutes as analogical sources of law similar to ju-
dicial precedent was contrary to the practice in many civil law sys-
tems. Indeed, the articles of Pound and Landis demonstrated that
the common law itself owed many of its major developments to a
liberal treatment of legislative material resembling that of civil law
systems.
Pound conceived of at least four ways in which common law courts
might treat legislative material:
(1) They might receive it fully into the body of the law as afford.
ing not only a rule to be applied but a principle from which
to reason, and hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the
general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the
same general subject; and so reason from it by analogy in pref-
erence to them. (2) They might receive it fully into the body of
the law to be reasoned from by analogy the same as any other
rule of law, regarding it, however, as of equal or co-ordinate au-
thority in this respect with judge-made rules upon the same
general subject. (3) They might refuse to receive it fully into the
body of the law and give effect to it directly only; refusing to
35. [I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes have been too
slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular cases may
imply a policy different from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude
a reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their scope.
Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924).
36. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955), centered on the question of whether an action
under the Jones Act survives the death of the tortfeasor shipowner. The problem con-
fronting the Court was that the Jones Act extended to seamen the same rights granted
to railway employees by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970),
which contained no specific provision for the survival of actions against deceased tort-
feasors. But, noting that FELA allowed the prosecution of wrongful death claims against
"the receiver or receivers or other persons or corporations charged with the duty of the
management and operation of the business of a common carrier," id. § 57, the Court
reasoned that since receivership was the "corporate analogue" of death, an action would
still lie against the personal representative of the deceased shipowner. 348 U.S. at 209.
37. Pound, supra note 6.
38. Landis, supra note 34.
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reason from it by analogy but giving it, nevertheless, a liberal
interpretation to cover the whole field it was intended to cover.
(4) They might not only refuse to reason from it by analogy and
apply it directly only, but also give to it a strict and narrow
interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases which it
covers expressly.39
He argued that common law jurisprudence was slowly evolving away
from the orthodox position embodied in the fourth method toward
ultimate adoption of the method embodied in the first. Though we
have certainly not reached the stage of legal development described
in Pound's first proposition, the Moragne opinion is at least an ap-
proach toward, if not an application of, that proposition. 40
As Pound noted, reasoning by analogy from statutes strikes many
trained in the common law as alien if not absurd. In the first place,
the objection is made that statutes are the product, not of reasoned
deliberation, but of clashes of interest in the legislative forum; that
they contain compromise, not principle, and therefore ought not to
be subjected to analogical extension. Furthermore, reasoning from
statutes as sources of law assumes that they will have some perma-
nency when, in fact, any statute can be amended or completely re-
versed by a succeeding legislature. These and other objections to
the methodology of analogical reasoning from statutes will be con-
sidered again later.41 For the present, it is only necessary to point
out that such objections have not inhibited the use of statutes as
analogical sources in civil law systems of the European continent.
Civil law theorists, like their Anglo-American counterparts, have
claimed a completeness and universality for their own principles.
4 2
Unlike the common law, however, the source of those legal principles
is not judicial precedent, but rather a legislatively enacted civil code.43
In orthodox civil law theory, the statute is conceived of as "being the
most satisfactory and perfect method of realizing justice," and as the
59. Pound, supra note 6, at 385-86.
40. In Moragne Justice Harlan argued that the trend of enactment of wrongful death
legislation reflected a public policy which deserved to be given precedence over earlier
judicially-created rules with respect to the same subject. See 398 U.S. at 390. Such judicial
deference to the generally expressed legislative will is precisely that contemplated by
Pound's first alternative methodology.
41. See pp. 279-80 infra.
42. The term "civil law," as used herein, refers primarily to the legal sstems of
France and Germany though most of the discussion is true also of those other European
legal systems which are derived, to a greater or lesser extent, from the ancient Roman
Law. Of course, the "civil law" is not identical in any two European countries though
certain methodological generalizations can be made. See F. Lwso., A Comsto. Lwyk
LooKs AT THE CML LAw 2-10 (1953).
43. See Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22 NorE DAME LAW. 1, 71-73 (1946).
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"unique source of judicial decisions. '4 4 When no rule can be found
which expressly covers a particular problem, civil law courts seek to
discern from a statute, or from a course of legislation, one or more
principles which can be applied to situations substantially similar
or analogous to (but not expressly covered by) the terms of the legis-
lation. The formal concepts, in the German system, have been ex-
plained as follows:
The principles that are basic to the Code carry the germ of
further development in themselves. This development is by way
of analogy. If a case is not regulated in the law but a legally
similar case is regulated, then this provision is decisive in the de-
ciding of the first case (Gesetzesanalogie) .... If no result can be
reached through this process of analogy, then the decision must
be drawn from the spirit of the whole law (Recht) considered as
one system (Rechtsanalogie).
45
Thus it can be seen that the Court's opinion in Moragne utilized
a legal methodology very much akin to the accepted methodology of
civil law jurisprudence, and, as will now be argued, not altogether
foreign to the common law either.
IV
Very early in the course of Anglo-American legal history, English
courts developed a doctrine known as the "equity of a statute.140 In
this sense the term "equity" had a well-understood meaning in the
law courts of England long before it came to refer to the doctrine of
the Court of Chancery. By the doctrine of equity of a statute, asso-
44. Charmont & Chausse, Les Interprdtes du Code Civil, in I Le'Covut CIVIL, 1801-
1904, LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE 133, 152-55 (1904), quoted in A. VoN ,EIIREN, TnE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR TIlE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 60 (1957).
45. 1 MOTIVE Zu DEM ENTWURFE EINES BURGERLICIEN GESurZBUClES FUR DAs DEUTsciIz
REICH 14-17 (1888), in VoN MEIIREN, supra note 44, at 64.
In a very provocative article, The Ninth Amendnent as Civil Lau' Method and its
Implications for Republican Form of Governnent: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966), Professor Mitchell Franklin forcefully
argues that Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), employs the civil law methodology of Rechtsanalogie. Douglas, it will be recalled,
contended that "penumbras" and "emanations" from various constitutional amendments
implicitly sanctioned a right to privacy. In Franklin's words:
What Justice Douglas meant is that although the first, third, fourth, and fifth amentl.
ments had no imperative force it was possible for him to project their total force
beyond the texts themselves so as to derive a general principle stated in none of
those amendments. He thus discovered a constitutional "right of privacy," though,
to repeat, such right could not be justified by genuine interpretation of any or all
of the amendments in question.
40 TUL. L. REV. 490-91.
46. See Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76 (1909).
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ciated most closely with Coke and Plowden, the application of a
statute might be judicially extended beyond its express terms, or
restricted so as to exclude certain instances admittedly within its ex-
press terms. Plowden seemed to conceive of the doctrine as a means
of effectuating legislative intent,47 while Coke viewed it more as a
necessary corollary of the practical limitations upon legislatures, as a
sort of ejusdem generis clause judicially appended to all legislation4
However viewed, the doctrine of equity of a statute undoubtedly gave
courts considerable freedom to derive and develop legal principles
from rules of statutory origin.
By the eighteenth century, however, English courts had abandoned
any claim to divine statutory equities. Landis argues that "[t]he
reasons for this professed self-abnegation of power seem extrinsic rath-
er than intrinsic to the nature of the law." 42 Among the extrinsic
factors he cites are the development of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the corollary view of judges as passive agents "finding" the
law, and finally the powerful influence of Blackstone and his view that
the common law was already a fully matured and self-sufficient sys-
tem.50 These factors operated to push the "equity" doctrine into
desuetude and to erect in its place the contrary principle that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.51
While the principle of strictly construing statutes was introduced
early into American law52 and has remained a fundamental principle
of our jurisprudence5 3 our courts have accomplished a great deal
that could have been subsumed under the prior "equity" doctrine.
The judicial response to the Married Women's Acts of the nineteenth
century is a notable example. The common law had relegated the mar-
47. And in order to form a right Judgment when the Letter of a Statute is re-
strained, and when enlarged by Equity, it is a good Way, when you peruse a Statute
to suppose that the Lawmaker is present, and that you have asked him the Qiucs-
tion you want to know touching the Equity, then you must give )'ourself such an
Answer as you imagine he would have done, if he had been present .... And if
the Law-maker would have followed the Equity, notwithstanding the Words of the
Law .... you may safely do the like, for while you can do no more than the Law.
maker would have done, you do not act contrary to the Law, but in Conformity to it.
Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowd, 459A, 465, 75 Eng. Rep. (1574), quoted in 3 J. SttL*,m-,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6001 (5d ed. 1943).
48. "Equitie" is a construction made by the Judges that cases out of the letter
of a statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of the making of the same.
shall be within the same remedy that the statute provideth; and the reason thereof
is, for that the lawmakers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms.
E. COKE, Iss-rrEs 024b.
49. Landis, supra note 34, at 217.
50. See note 3 supra.
51. Landis, supra note 34, at 217.
52. Id.
53. J. SUTHR.AND, supra note 46, at §§ 6201-06.
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tied woman to a legal status of virtual non-existence by imposing lia-
bility upon the husband for the antenuptial contracts and torts of his
wife, by granting the husband ownership of the wife's personal prop.
erty and income from her realty, and by engaging in the general
fiction of the legal identity of the husband and wife."a The Married
Women's Acts did not expressly direct any overall change in status,
but only in certain of its incidents. That is, these statutes were gen-
erally quite brief, merely gTanting the right to own and convey
property, and to sue and be sued. But courts tended to regard the
changes in these particular incidents as so fundamental that all other
incidents of married women's status had to be radically revised as well."
A similar phenomenon involving analogical development of the
law occurred in the area of bastardy law. There, the enactment of
certain limited intestacy laws granting to illegitimate children the
right to maternal inheritance" served to persuade many courts to
reevaluate and expand their prior constructions of the word "child"
within the terms of statutes regulating wrongful death, wills, work-
men's compensation, etc.5 7 Another example of such reasoning may
be found in the area of property law, where courts looked to the
standard twenty year statute of limitations for statutorily created
rights of adverse possession in order to establish the length of time
54. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, *443.
55. There has been general recognition that the married women's acts embodied
principles which were of wider import than the statutes in terms expressed and
thus necessitated remoulding common-law doctrines to fit the statutory aims.
Landis, supra note 34, at 223.
The Nineteenth Amendment has also been regarded at times as embodying ceitahlt
principles to be given effect beyond the express terms of that amendment. For example,
in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), justice Sutherland argued that
since the Nineteenth Amendment carried with it the implication that women were as
capable of wresting a living wage as men, legislation establishing minimum wages for
women would be unconstitutional.
A quite contrary view of the Nineteenth Amendment seems to have been at work it
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Harper v. Va. Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
according to Franklin, supra note 51, at 493. Franklin accuses Justice Harlan of suggesthig
that because the Nineteenth Amendment forbids denial of voting rights on the basis of
sex, no further extension of voting rights beyond the amendment's explicit directive
would be appropriate. Franklin, of course, views the matter differently, and suggests that
the Nineteenth Amendment could well have been invoked as an analogy to strengthen
the Harper majority opinion.
56. See Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 76-79 (1959).
57. Much like the married woman, the illegitimate child was treated by tie common
law as a legal non-entity, as a jilius nullius. See 1 IV. BAcKs'roNE, COMMENTARIES 0459
For this reason, courts had generally construed the word "child" when used In the types
of statutes referred to in the text, to include only legitimate children. See, e.g., T. A'IKIN-
SON, WILLS 81-82 (2d ed. 1953). But after the enactment of the limited intestacy laws,
many American courts came to the conclusion, when reconsidering the old coummon law
doctrines in light of the new statutory enactments, that "the analogy of modern statutes
rather than the old common law should be resorted to." J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND
LAWYE.RS' REASONINGS 229 n.102 (1966). See, e.g., Marshall v. Industrial Comum'n, 3,12 111.
400, 174 N.E. 534 (1931).
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necessary to establish a right or title by common law prescription.! s
A final example is the judicial creation of civil liability for criminal
conduct. , 9
These and numerous other instances of the judicial use of statutory
material as sources of law, lend credence to Landis' conclusion that
"there is something intrinsic in the attitude toward legislation that
was once phrased by reference to the equity of the statute, that can-
not be exorcised from the law." 0 But if Landis is correct that our
courts, despite their disavowals, have continued reason by analogy
from statutes, then he must also be correct that their failure to ex-
plicitly acknowledge this practice has had unfortunate consequences."'
This failure has discredited the idea of a "science" of statutory in-
terpretation and has thwarted the development of statutes as generative
sources of law.
Since the classic presentations of Pound and Landis, other com-
mentators, both on and off the bench, have echoed their arguments.
For example, in 1936 Harlan Fiske Stone urged that coordination
of legislative and judicial sources of law was one of the major tasks
facing the American legal system.0 2 Again, in 1956 Walter V. Schaefer,
Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, saw Pound's evolutionary
development continuing and gave it his approval.0 3 Finally, in 1970
Professor Charles L. Black forcefully argued for the adoption of a
style of legal reasoning closely resembling the second of Pound's
four hypotheses. 64
V
Despite the prior development (albeit often disguised) of such ana-
logical reasoning from statutes, Justice Harlan's opinion in Moragne
might still be viewed as something of a "sport" in our law. Because
of the anomalous and probably unintended predicament confronting
Mrs. Moragne and the felt need for a uniform maritime answer to
the question of wrongful death recovery, the abundance of language
about finding underlying principles in legislation may have been no
58. See Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 226 (1917).
59. See Landis, supra note 34, at 220.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id.
62. Stone, supra note 4, at 4.
63. W. SCHAEF.R, PRECEDENT AND POLICY (1956) quoted in H. BERMAN & W. GIEINEI ,
THE NATuRE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 356, 360 (1958).
64. See Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASu. L- Rix. 3,
41-44 (1970).
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more than a makeweight for the Court's decision. 5 Such a view of
Moragne, however, is belied by the concurring opinion delivered by
Justice Harlan on the same day in Welsh v. United States.10 Justice
Harlan's opinion in Welsh suggests that he was quite serious about
employing-openly and explicitly-the methodology of finding a prin-
ciple in legislation and then extending it beyond the express statutory
terms.
Welsh concerned the prosecution of a draft registrant who claimed
exemption as a conscientious objector and refused induction. His
claim to conscientious objector status had been denied because his
opposition to participation in war was not based on "religious train-
ing and belief," as required by section 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 7 but instead on strong, ethical opposition
to such participation. The majority opinion reversed the conviction
on the grounds that the exemption had been improperly denied.
Following and extending the rationale of United States v. Seeger,08
the Court held that Congress had used the terms "religious training
and belief" in their broadest possible meaning which encompassed
a sincerely and deeply held moral and ethical code not in fact based
solely on political or sociological considerations.0 9
Justice Harlan, however, refused to perpetuate what he plainly
regarded as a charade. He declared that the Court's opinion had only
confirmed his fear that he had been wrong in joining the Court's
opinion in Seeger five years earlier, and he rejected the attempt to
cloak the Court's logic in the language of statutory construction.70
He was convinced that both the language and the legislative history
of section 60) clearly supported the view that Congress meant to
distinguish not only between religious and secular objectors, but
between theistic and non-theistic "religious" objectors as well. Since
Justice Harlan thought Congress' intent was quite clear, he had to
face the constitutional question: Could Congress so distinguish with-
out running afoul of the religious guarantees of the First Amendment?
65. The Court's decision could have rested on the simple-and justifiable-ovcrruling
of precedent alone. See p. 262 supra.
66. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
67. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456() (1970).
68. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
69. The majority opinion employs a rather tortured process of statutory construction
in order to arrive at this result. As will be argued shortly, however, this resort to the
device of statutory construction frequently occurs when a court views itself as limited to
the orthodox common law approach to legislation and the traditional formulation of
equal protecti6n analysis. See p. 276 infra. The result in Welsh is far less persuasive
than it could have been had the court not viewed its role as so limited.
70. 398 U.S. at 345.
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That question, he concluded, also had to be answered in the negative. 71
Having decided that Congress' intent to exempt only theistic be-
lievers was unconstitutional, however, Justice Harlan still faced the
question of what to do with the petitioner. He recognized that there
were at least two possible solutions to the defect of underinclusive-
ness-first, to strike down the exemption altogether or, second, to
extend its benefits to all those who should have been included.
72
Justice Harlan felt compelled, by the tradition of exempting re-
ligious conscientious objectors, to take the latter approach and thus
join in the result reached by the majority "not as a matter of statu-
tory construction, but as the touchstone for salvaging a congressional
policy of long standing that would otherwise have to be nullified."
7 3
This section of Justice Harlan's Welsh concurrence is a thorough
and convincing discussion of the principles that govern judicial dis-
cretion to expand the application of a statute beyond its express terms
to remedy its underinclusiveness. The judicial task, he observed,
is to simultaneously discern and distinguish "the residual prin-
ciple in legislation that should be given effect in circumstances
not covered by the express statutory terms and the limitation
on that principle inherent in the same words."
1 4
Once this crucial distinction is perceived, a court must then ask
whether the legislation in question encompasses all the groups that
71. Congress, of course, could . . . eliminate all exemptions for conscientious ob-
jectors. . . . However, having chosen to exempt, it cannot draw the line between
theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the
other. Any such distinctions are not in my view, compatible with the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
398 U.S. at 356.
72. 398 U.S. at 361. Harlan supports the contention that such alternative solutions
exist by citation to dicta in two prior Supreme Court decisions, Skinner v. Oklahoma.
316 U.S. 535 (1942), and Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 US. 239 (1931).
In Skinner, the Court found unconstitutionally underinclusive a state statute that re-
quired sterilization of habitual thieves who committed larcenies, but not those who
embezzled. The Court noted the alternatives of either extending the statute so as to apply
to embezzlers as well, or striking it down altogether for underinclusion. In Bennett,
petitioners claimed that their right to equal protection had been violated by being taxed
more heavily than their competitors. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, noted
that, "The right invoked is that to equal treatment; and such treatment will be at-
tained if either their competitors' taxes are increased or their own reduced." 284 U.S.
at 247. In light of the impracticability of the former solution, the Court simply ordered
a refund of the overpayment.
It should be noted, however, that neither Skinner nor Bennelt are in fact appropriate
cases for a judicial expansion of legislative terms. Bennett, involving a tax statute, and
Skinner, involving a criminal penalty, are examples of two areas in which it is suggested
at p. 281 infra that a court would rarely be justified in extending a statute beyond its
express terms.
73. 398 U.S. at 345.
74. Id. at 347.
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ought naturally to be included.7 5 Applied to the facts of Welsh,
Harlan reasoned that "[t]he 'radius' of this legislation is the con-
scientiousness with which an individual opposes war in general."7 0
Having found this common denominator, Justice Harlan was willing
to extend the scope of the admittedly underinclusive legislation by
insisting that the exemption be applied to the very individuals it
purported to exclude.7 7
VI
Justice Harlan, in his Welsh opinion, employs what lie describes
as an "equal protection mode of analysis" 8 to determine whether the
statutory exemption given to one class of persons ought to be ex-
tended judicially to encompass others. His choice of this label for
what has been described in this Note as essentially a civil law method
of reasoning, is interesting because our traditional framework of equal
protection analysis offers perhaps the closest parallel to the meth-
odology of the civil law. At the same time, the choice illuminates
some of the most striking contrasts between the conception of the
judicial function in the civil and common law systems. What follows
does not purport to be an interpretation, either historical or doc-
trinal, of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend.
ment. The term "equal protection" will be used here, as Justice
Harlan used it in Welsh, to illustrate a process of reasoning em-
ployed in the traditional mode of analysis associated with that term,
rather than to describe the complexities of the "New Equal Pro-
tection" of "fundamental interests" and "suspect classifications."'"7
The standard formulation of equal protection analysis was stated
in the classic article of Tussman and tenBroek, "The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws."' 0 They sought to develop a systematic analysis
of how courts ought to accommodate the conflicting demands of the
mandate for equality and the practical legislative necessity of clas-
sification. They termed their formulation the doctrine of "reasonable
classification" which, simply stated, requires that all those similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of a given piece of legislation
be similarly treated.8' When a statute does not include all who are
75. Id. at 357.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 357, quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970).
79. See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 19-39 (1969).
80. 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
81. Id. at 344-45.
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similarly situated-that is, when it is underinclusive-"there is a
prima facie violation of the equal protection requirement of rea-
sonable classification." 82 Courts, however, have generally allowed
easy rebuttal of this prima facie violation. A classification, though
discriminatory, is deemed to be neither arbitrary nor violative of
the principle of equal protection if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived to sustain it. s3 It is not even necessary that the legis-
lature has in fact considered the reason perceived by a court, but
only that it might have done so.
8 4
It is here that the methodology of civil law systems has its closest
relationship to our traditional conception of equal protection. Under
our traditional view, underinclusive legislation will be invalidated
unless some reasonable justification can be perceived for the legis-
lature's failure to extend the benefits or burdens of that legislation
to others who would appear to be similarly situated with respect to
the legislation's purpose. But under civil law methodology, the bene-
fits or burdens of a particular piece or course of legislation will be
extended to those similarly situated, unless it can be shown that there
is no justification for analogous treatment because no sound analogy
itself exists. Our inquiry must then be whether these are but two
opposite ways of saying the same thing. That is, will the same set
of circumstances which would justify a common law court's deter-
mination that there was reasonable justification for the statutory
classifications established by the legislature also justify the con-
clusion of a civil law court that there was no sound reason for ex-
tending the benefits or burdens of a particular statute beyond its
express terms because no sound analogy exists? The answer, it seems,
must be negative. Each of the two competing methodologies pur-
ports to be firmly rooted in the legislative will.8s  The common
82. Id. at 348.
83. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959); State Bd.
of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co..
240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
84. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1207, 1226 n.68 (1970).
No inference is intended here as to the appropriateness of the "reasonable classification"
test, or any other test, as valid interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The logical validity of the reasonable classification test has
recently come under attack elsewhere. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and
Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court shows no
signs of abandoning its use. See, for recent examples, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972); Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
85. See J. STONE, TE PROvINCE AND FuNcrON OF LAw 151 (1946).
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law judge, however, employs the presumption that the legislature
did consider the excluded class, and chose to exclude it for a valid
reason, so long as the court can determine that such a reason does
possibly exist. The civil law jurist, on the other hand, will presume
that the legislature intended all the logical consequences following
from those principles which can be abstracted from a specific legis-
lative formulation."0 Thus, although both methodologies focus on
the same problem of statutory underinclusivity, diametrically op-
posed (though often fictitious) presumptions are employed regarding
legislative intent. As a result, circumstances in which common law
courts purport to follow legislative intent by upholding statutory
classifications might well lead a civil law court-with equal deference
to the presumed legislative will-to expand such classifications.
An obvious question remains. If the presumptions employed by
both methodologies are often fictitious and, in any case, evidence
of legislative intent is usually ambiguous or wholly absent, which of
these presumptions will most likely lead to results which are analyti-
cally persuasive and which respect the coordinate authority of the
legislative and judicial processes? American courts have traditionally
viewed the choices before them as limited either to striking down un-
derinclusive legislation altogether or finding some justification for
sanctioning its classifications. Therefore, they have been willing to
bend far to find some basis for the legislature's action in order to
defer to its coordinate authority and avoid the charge of "judicial
legislating." But if the choices before the courts are not so limited
and legislation can be judicially expanded so as to provide the same
burden or benefit to parties not expressly covered by the legislation
(but analogously situated), then our courts may not always have
been deferring to the legislative will by so narrowly perceiving their
own role.
A recent example should make this point clear. Sweney Gasoline
& Oil Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 7 involved an action by
the lessee gas company for damages to leased premises caused by the
negligent derailment of a train belonging to the lessor railroad. The
lease agreement between the parties contained a clause exculpating
the lessor railroad from liability for damage caused by its own neg-
ligence. Illinois common law recognized the general validity of ex-
culpatory clauses in leases.88 But in 1959 the Illinois legislature had
86. Id. at 151-52.
87. 42 Ill. 2d 265, 247 N.E.2d 603 (1969).
88. O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958).
Vol. 82: 258, 1972
Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law
attempted to overturn this common law rule through legislation
which declared void all exculpatory clauses in leases, "except those
business leases in which any municipal corporation, governmental
unit, or corporations regulated by a State or Federal Commission or
agency is lessor or lessee . "s9 When the lessee gas company
brought an action for damages, the railroad set up in defense the
lease clause, and the protection of that clause embodied in the excep-
tion to the statute. Agreeing with plaintiff's argument that the statu-
tory exception of governmental units and regulated corporations was
discriminatory and without any reasonable basis, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held for the defendant railroad nonetheless. Because
the statute created an unconstitutional discrimination by granting a
preferred status to regulated corporations, the court reasoned that
the statute as a whole was void.00 There being no remaining statute
to regulate the field, the court looked for its answer in the common
law which, as previously suggested, recognized the validity of ex-
culpatory lease clauses. Thus, the net effect of the legislative effort
to overturn the common law rule was absolutely nil.
Justice Schaefer 0l dissented on the grounds that although the
statute as written was unconstitutional, it nevertheless served as an
"expression of public policy which fully justifies this court in now
holding, as a matter of common law, that exculpatory clauses in
leaseholds are void." 92 His willingness to accord the policy behind the
statute precedence over the older common law rule (unconstitutional
though the statute was as enacted) is yet another example of the first
of Pound's four hypotheses regarding judicial treatment of legisla-
tion. 93 Like Justice Harlan in Velsh, Justice Schaefer believed that
the constitutional difficulty inhered not in the statute itself, but in
the exemption from the statute's requirements. Eliminating the ex-
emption through analogical expansion of the statute's principles could
cure the constitutional defect and give effect to the general legisla-
tive will in its most recent and direct expression.
The majority of the Sweney court was unable to achieve the same
89. Law of April 13, 1959, p. 98, § 1 [1959], Ill. Laws 1959, replaced by I. AW. STAT.
ch. 80, § 91 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
90. The court did not further elaborate its reasons for believing that the statute's
classification had no rational relation to its statutory purpose. For the present analysis,
however, it is not important whether the equal protection rationality test was correctly
applied, but only that the court purported to be using it.
91. Justice Schaefer is well aware of the potentialities of analogical reasoning from
statutes. See note 63 supra.
92. 42 Ill. 2d at 269, 247 N.E.2d at 606 (emphasis added).
93. See p. 265 supra.
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result through utilization of traditional equal protection methodology.
Once the court had decided that there was no conceivable justifica-
tion for drawing a line between regulated and non-regulated cor-
porations, the statute was treated as if it was totally devoid of any
generative influence. The court argued for deference to the legis-
lature but refused to accord the statute any significance because it
had "no way of knowing whether the legislature would have en-
acted the statute without the fatal exceptions."
94
This approach, it must be recognized, leads to embarrassing re-
sults precisely because the court has refused to ask the only im-
portant question. Is there a "residual principle" that remains in a
piece of legislation, even after a constitutional defect has been dis-
covered in it, and should a court give effect to that principle despite
the defect? The court in Sweney, while ostensibly refusing to ask
this question, in effect answered it in the negative. But it is hardly
judicial deference to negate entirely the effect of a legislature's ac-
tions and then require the probable ritual of enacting a new statute
without the troublesome exemption. Whether the Sweney court's
decision would have been different if it had actually undertaken
the inquiry suggested here is immaterial. It is only important to
point out that the inquiry should have been undertaken. Under
either approach, the legislature would remain free to change the
court's result if it found it unsatisfactory. And in Sweney it did.
In 1971 the Illinois legislature did what the Illinois Supreme Court
thought itself incapable of doing and declared all exculpatory lease
clauses void.95 Thus, in at least some cases the analogical method-
ology under discussion involves no more (and possibly less) "judi.
cial legislating" than the traditional equal protection approaches.
If our common law courts in fact are not restricted to a choice
between overturning arguably underinclusive legislation or search-
ing for some conceivable rationale by which to sanction it, then a
third course is open to them. The terms of an underinclusive statute
can be expanded so as to encompass all parties analogously situated
with respect to the principles embodied in the express terms of the
statute. If this course is followed, then a great many cases which
have been argued and decided on other grounds can perhaps be
better explained and understood in terms of the type of analysis
suggested here.
94. 42 Ill. 2d at 270, 247 N.E.2d at 606.
95. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
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In Moragne, for example, there would surely seem to be some
conceivable justification under a traditional equal protection ap-
proach for the classifications established in each of the relevant wrong-
ful death statutes. Where a court is not necessarily constrained by
the express terms of those same statutes, however, that consideration
does not foreclose an inquiry as to whether those statutes, taken to-
gether, embody a principle which would be served by extending their
remedy to the petitioner before the court.
In this regard Moragne is reminiscent of a much earlier admiralty
decision, International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,"" which held
that the Jones Act, which was expressly applicable only to "seamen,"
was equally applicable to longshoremen. Here again, the Court might
have been able to reach the same result in a more persuasive man-
ner through the expansive process of analogical reasoning from
statutes. But without even considering the case in terms of an equal
protection mode of analysis, and confined within the limits of tra-
ditional common law methodology, the Court was compelled to em-
ploy a very dubious process of statutory construction to bring the
plaintiff within the Jones Act's ambit. 7
Other examples of an expansive "statutory construction" approach
to get around results which would have been dictated by traditional
equal protection analysis are not difficult to find. Girouard v. United
96. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
97. In Haverty it was very important for the plaintiff longshoreman to assert his
claim under the recently enacted Jones Act which, for its remedies, abolished the com-
mon law defense of "fellow servant," a defense which would otherwise have prevailed
over Haverty's claim. The problem, however, was that the Jones Act applied only to
"seamen," a term which, prior to Haverty, had been almost uniformly assumed to refer
to those who actually man ships and not to longshoremen. See G. Gt,-stoRE & C. ISLAt,
supra note 12, at 358. Moreover, Haverty was without any remedy under a state work-
men's compensation act because the application of such acts to longshoremen had twice
been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.
253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 203 (1917).
Even if the Court had considered the possibility, a solution to Haverty's dilemma could
not easily have been found within the framework of an equal protection mode of analy-
sis. It surely would not have been difficult to conceive of some rational justification for
granting certain benefits to seamen and not to longshoremen. Thus, in an effort to find
a remedy for Haverty, the Court was forced to ignore altogether the long-standing conno-
tation of the term "seamen," and reason that since modern longshoremen perform tasks
traditionally done by "seamen," that word would be construed in the Jones Act to
encompass longshoremen as well. What the Court purported to do by "statutory con-
struction" in Haverty was, in effect, an extension by analogy of the Jones Act to a
class of workers probably not within the contemplation of the Congress when it passed
that act. The Court's creative result was clearly necessary, however, for as Gilmore and
Black have observed,
without something like Haverty, this class of worker [longshoreman], and this class
almost alone in the entire country, would have found its recovery for unavoidable
industrial accidents barred by the harsh nineteenth century rules of fellow servant
and the like.
G. GmMORE & C. BLAcK, supra note 12, at 361.
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States"8 can be understood in these terms. There, the Supreme Court
was faced with the petition for naturalization of an alien conscien-
tious objector. The Court overruled its own clear precedent that
such aliens could not be naturalized by inferring a principle that
would allow naturalization from certain legislative enactments which
did not, by their express terms, even apply to the petitioner before
the Court. 99
Each of the above cases is offered simply as an instance in which
our courts have invoked the language of "statutory construction" to
reach results which would seem more understandable and persuasive
if recast in terms of reasoning by analogy. Why, then, have American
courts so often cloaked such analogical reasoning in a misleading
doctrinal guise? The answer seems to lie in certain doubts which
American judges have concerning the scope of their powers in re-
lation to legislation. Tussman and tenBroek have advocated the
nearly standardless "any conceivable justification" criterion of equal
protection analysis in part because of their belief that "[t]he legis-
lature, after all, has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have
only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct."' 100 But civil law meth-
odology, while incorporating extensive judicial discretion with respect
to legislation, may in some cases be more faithful to the general legis-
lative will than would traditional equal protection methodology." 1
Justice Harlan's concurrent opinions in Moragne and Welsh, more-
over, strongly suggest that American courts can legitimately exercise
such an expanded role with respect to legislation.
98. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
99. The problem in Girouard was the following: Part of the naturalization process
was the taking of an oath to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic." Nationality Act of
1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1970). Three prior
decisions of the Supreme Court squarely stood for the proposition that an alien who
refused to bear arms could not be admitted to citizenship. United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636 (1931); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 603 (1931); United States v. Schwln-
mer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Despite a vigorous legislative attempt to overrule the effect of
those decisions, the naturalization statutes and the oath requirement had been reenacted
in the same form as when the previous cases were decided. Congress had also, however,
in certain 1942 amendments to the Nationality Act of 1940, Second War Powers Act, cit.
199, § 701, 56 Stat. 182 (1942), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (1970), relaxed certain of the
naturalization requirements for aliens who had served honorably in the armed forces
during World War II. These amendments had been construed to apply even to those who
had served as non-combatants. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 59 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 19.15);
In re Kinloch, 53 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Wash. 1944). Although this legislation did not
expressly apply to the petitioner, the Court nevertheless concluded that it embodied
the principle that "one could be attached to the principles of our government anti coutld
support and defend it even though his religious conviction prevented him from bearing
arms.' 328 U.S. at 70. Extending this principle to the petitioner, the Court found no
reason to deny him citizenship, and thus overruled its own precedent.
100. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 80, at 373.
101. See pp. 274-76 supra.
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VII
If Justice Harlan's opinions in Welsh and Moragne are read as
accepting into common law jurisprudence a style of judicial reasoning
closely patterned on the civil law methodology of reasoning from
statutes by analogy, then it seems necessary to set forth some of the
considerations which determine whether, in a given case, utilization
of the methodology is appropriate. As has already been made clear,
the legal methodology discussed in this Note is quite unfamiliar to
many whose training is solely in the common law. A possible danger,
therefore, is that the very unfamiliarity of the doctrine will give it
an immediate superficial attractiveness. Initially grasped, the meth-
odology seems capable of giving almost any solution desired for a
particular problem. For that very reason it is doubly important to
suggest some of the parameters of the methodology and some of the
very weighty restraints upon its use.
One of the most fundamental considerations to be kept in mind
is that the civil law conception of the legislative function differs
substantially from the accepted American view of that function. In
both systems it is the legislature's job to adjust and regulate com-
peting interests..10 2 But in civil law systems, such as those of France
and Germany, that adjustment is viewed by the courts as a legislative
attempt to formulate a complete body of principles and concepts in
the form of a Civil Code "so as to furnish a legislative basis for
juristic and judicial development along modem lines."103 Often,
these principles are stated in very general terms rather than with
the precise particularity of most American legislation. Also, the civil
law view of legislation, or at least that part of it which is incorporated
in the Civil Codes, must necessarily assume a sort of permanency,
while the traditional American view assumes that legislation may be
amended or repealed at any time and is therefore relatively transient.
In this regard the legislation of a European Code might usefully be
likened to a constitution.1 0 4 Thus, legislation in civil law countries is
drafted with a view to the fact that it will be used by the courts as
a source of law to be reasoned from by analogy,10 or so the courts
presume.
102. See P. HEcK, BEGRIFFSBILDUNG UND INTERESSEJURtSPRUDFNZ (1932). quoted in
TnE JURISPRUDENcE OF ITEREsTs: SELEcTm WRiTNGS 102-04 (M. Schoch ed. 19-18).
103. Pound, supra note 43, at 71.
104. See F. LAwsoN, supra note 42, at 55-61.
105. The first draft of the German Civil Code contained the following.
Relationships for which the code does not contain any provisions are to be regu-
lated by the corresponding application of the provisions applicable to similar legal
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This view of the legislative function seems to contradict the gen-
erally accepted pressure group theory of legislation in the United
States. We simply do not demand that our legislatures treat all anal-
ogously situated parties in identical ways. Therefore, to suggest that
the courts ought to extend the principle of a certain piece of legis.
lation to other analogous interests not actually provided for by
statute seems to ring of usurpation, when the reason for not so ex-
tending the statute stems solely from political factors already con-
sidered by the legislature. Any adoption of civil law methodology
must inevitably take this factor into account. It should be recalled,
however, that commentators also have recognized the incompatibility
of the pure pressure theory of legislation and the requirement of
equal protection.'" 0 The argument is essentially that between the
conception of equal protection as a generalizing requirement set forth
by Justice Jackson in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York107
and the various attacks made upon that conception.108 The argument
cannot be renewed here; but any effort to use the methodology of
analogical reasoning from statutes in our legal system must ulti-
mately deal with the widely held view of legislation as the accom-
modation of clashing interests rather than the embodiment of logi-
cal principles. 0 9 There are, for example, certain areas of our law
where courts have traditionally construed legislative language quite
relationships. In the absence of such provisions, the provisions arising from the
spirit of the legal order are to be applied.
This language was omitted from the second draft of the Code because it was felt to be
obvious and unnecessary, no special provision for the use of analogy being required. See
F. R.ATZ, ENTWuRF EINES BURGERLICHEN Gsarzauciis (1894), quoted in A. VON MEUEN,
supra note 44, at 65.
106. See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 80, at 350.
107. Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable any govern-
mental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that tile pro-
hibition or regulation must have a broader impact .... iT]here is no more effective
practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally.
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (concurring opinion).
108. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 225-26:
[Our legislatures] are political institutions, and we should not require them also
to be disinterested; they are indeed the forum for clashes of interest.
109. It is not at all clear what judicial consequences flow from an acceptance of the
pure pressure theory of legislation. For example, in the fairly frequent ease In which
legislative history is either wholly absent or ambiguous, courts can only look to the terms
of a statute in construing it. Moreover, even where some legislative history is available,
courts arc often asked to decide what a legislature would have done had it known that
the statute, as enacted, would contain some constitutional defect. Welsh and Su'eney are
examples of this latter situation. See pp. 271-72, 275-76 supra. In either situation the
pure pressure theory of legislation does not seem to dictate any one judicial response.
Absent legislative direction, courts ought to be free to reach results which are both
analytically sound and logically persuasive. The methodology or reasoning from statutes
by analogy may, in many cases, be best suited to achieve such results. See pp. 273-74
supra.
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narrowly and must continue to do so. Quite obviously, criminal
statutes are drawn with a specificity of purpose and must be aimed
at clearly defined conduct. One essential component of political liberty
is that a citizen know when the conduct in which he is engaged is
unlawful.110 Also, analogical reasoning from statutes should not ne-
gate the familiar canon of statutory construction whereby those con-
structions are avoided which would render a statute unconstitution-
al."' Finally, the analogical methodology would probably also be
inappropriate in such areas as tax legislation, where the laws are ex-
pected to be drawn with such specificity that the taxpayer can legiti-
mately take advantage of whatever "loopholes" are available, and
where the legislature is quite clearly and permissibly favoring or
disfavoring one specific interest over another.
112
But just as there are some areas in our law where the method-
ology is inappropriate, so there are other areas which seem ripe for
its use. In the last several decades, the American legal system has
itself been codifying its rules in the form of various uniform laws and
restatements. In part, these represent nothing more than an effort
to systematically arrange and restate old common law principles. Yet
at times there is also an effort to depart from and change the prior
judicially-created rules. Where this latter attempt is made, our courts
ought not try to harness codifying innovation with the trappings of
the old common law. The change clearly represents a dissatisfaction
with the old common law authority, and here the courts ought to
be liberal in reasoning from legislation by analogy, rather than cling-
ing tenaciously to the disfavored common law rules. 113
Another area in which the methodology described here could be
employed extensively is in the area of landlord and tenant law. Like
all other areas of American property law, the law of landlord and
110. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 47, at § 5604.
111. See Haynes v. United States, 590 U.S. 85, 92 (1968); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.
17, 27 (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
112. On the inappropriateness of traditional equal protection analysis to taxing legis-
lation see Ely, supra note 84, at 1235-48.
Even here, however, the rule of strict interpretation may not always be applied. See,
e.g., Reich v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 454 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1972). afl'g 52
T.C. 700 (1969), in which, again by a tortured process of "statutory construction" the oil
and gas depletion allowance was held to be available to a power company extracting gco-
thermal steam from the earth.
113. See Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the Negotiable
Instruments Law: The Civil Law Analogy, 6 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1931); Franklin. The His-
toric Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement as Transitional to Codification,
47 HAav. L. REv. 1367 (1934); Franklin, On The Legal Method of the Uniform Com.
mercial Code, 1951 LAw & CoNTrP. PROD. 330.
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tenant has been dominated by judicially-created common law rules.
Growing dissatisfaction with some of these common law results has
led to the adoption of remedial legislation, often in the form of
housing codes. There is at least some indication that courts will
view this legislation as an indication of dissatisfaction with the com-
mon law and hence as a source of new principles to be applied more
broadly.114
The methodology has already been used, in a slightly different
way, by federal courts when faced with the task of determining some
of the incidents of a federal cause of action. Typically, this takes the
form of utilizing state statutes of limitation applicable to analogous
types of claims to define the limitations of federal rights of action
for which no federal statute of limitations has been provided.11 This
type of process seems almost inevitable where new federal causes of
action are created, either legislatively or judicially. 110
The above are meant only to be suggestive of the sorts of areas
in our legal system where the methodology of reasoning by analogy
from statutes can usefully be employed. Certainly, the short list pro-
vided is not exhaustive. Indeed, arguments based on statutory anal.
ogy will probably appear to some degree in nearly all areas of our
law. When used, however, the argument must necessarily be met
with a number of other objections in addition to those fundamental
constraints considered in the first paragraphs of this section.
In this regard, Justice Harlan's opinion in Welsh, by its very
thoroughness, is suggestive of many of the restraints upon reasoning
from statutes by analogy. Broadly speaking, these restraints can be
grouped into two general categories. The first and perhaps most
fundamental are those purely formal restraints which inhere in any
114. See, e.g., Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412.13 (1961).
115. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610 (1895); but see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
116. This very point was raised, but left unresolved, in Moragne. The Court there, In
effect, created a federal cause of action under the general maritime law for death caused
by breach of a maritime duty, but left open the many questions pertaining to the exact
nature of the remedy so created, e.g., the applicable statute of limitations, the question
of which beneficiaries are entitled to recover, the question of whether recovery for such
non-pecuniary losses as pain and suffering and loss of consortium would be allowed,
the effect of contributory negligence, etc. As the Court recognized, these incidents will
have to be borrowed from one or more of the related statutes (the Death on the High
Seas Act, the Jones Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, or a state wrong-
ful death statute) according to whichever provides the best analogy. See 398 U.S. at 405.
08. The government argued as amicus curiae, and the Court seemed to suggest, that the
Death on the High Seas Act furnished the best analogy from which to draw these Inci-
dents. The lower courts have generally followed this lead but have not done so uni-
formly. Compare Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1970) with Dennis
v. Central Gulf Steamship, 323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971) and Thomas v. C. J. Langeit-
felder & Son, 324 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1971).
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system of analogical reasoning. Reasoning by analogy from statutes
requires all the subtleties and rigors of logic that reasoning from
case law requires. "Analogy" must mean more than simply ukase.
The strength of the system depends upon its devotion to principle.
And just as the legislature may overrule a decision developed through
the complexity of common law reasoning, so it may overrule a de-
cision reached through the methodology of reasoning by analogy from
prior legislative enactments. And finally, though the pursuit of this
methodology is to find analogies, the existence of distinctions must
also be kept in mind.11 7
The second set of limitations derive more or less from the problem
of correctly ascertaining legislative intent. This point was raised earlier
in the discussion of Sweney, and deserves reemphasis because of its
general nature. Every effort to perceive in legislation one or more
principles intended to have application beyond the express terms of
the legislation, must confront the argument embodied in the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius."1s By this maxim, the legis-
lature's failure to make a statute applicable in other circumstances
or to other parties implies an intent by the legislature that the statute
should not be applied in those other circumstances or to those other
parties. But to apply this maxim to the face of every statute is to en-
gage in a fictional presumption. An intent to exclude can never be
proven by the mere failure to include. This is a question on which
only the legislative history can shed light. If it can be shown that
the legislature either did not consider the application of the legis-
lation in the particular circumstances, or that it could not have be-
cause those circumstances were plainly unforeseeable at the time,
then the maxim should carry no weight at all.
Another aspect to the problem of determining the restraint im-
posed by legislative intent is the following:
The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory lan-
guage that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legis-
lation is one that guides us when circumstances not plainly
covered by the terms of a statute are subsumed by the under-
lying policies to which Congress was committed. Care must be
taken, however, to respect the limits to enact a particular policy,
especially when the boundaries of a statute are drawn as a com-
promise resulting from the countervailing pressures of other
policies.119
117. See Black, supra note 64, at 42.
118. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." See also J. StUMR.LANo,
supra note 47, at § 6104.
119. United States v. Sisson, 399 US. 267, 297-98 (1970).
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While the idea conveyed in the quoted passage is that narrow, literal
reading is required of legislation that results from compromises be-
tween powerful contending forces, it seems directly contradicted by
the following consideration:
The familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers . . . has particular
application in the construction of labor legislation which is to
a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between
contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized
labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appro-
priate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power
of managemerit and labor to further their respective interests.
120
Perhaps the best example of an instance in which the restraint sug-
gested by the first passage quoted above has been blithely ignored
is in United States v. Hutcheson.121 There, Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing for a divided Court, decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act,122
though in terms concerned only with injunctions, also exempted
labor unions from civil or criminal prosecution under the antitrust
laws. Authors of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (of whom Frankfurter
was one) had been at pains to secure its passage through repeated
assurances that the act would not affect any of the judicial remedies
otherwise available in labor disputes.12 3 Frankfurter's rare show of
judicial non-restraint exposed him to bitter ad hominem attacks and
led one commentator to remark that, "The majority opinion displays
a boldness of judicial technique seldom to be observed,"1 24 and to
suggest further that the whole opinion be treated as dicta, while
adopting a concurring opinion as the rule of the case.1 25 Though it
may not have been appropriate in the particular case, it can hardly
be said that the judicial technique employed was exceptionally bold.
As the Harlan opinions in Moragne and Welsh clearly show, these
limitations need not bar the explicit use of analogical reasoning from
statutes. Nevertheless, it is difficult at this point to assess the impact
of Moragne and Welsh on American law. Perhaps these opinions re-
120. National Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967) (citatlons
omitted).
121. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
123. See Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power Over the Labor Injunction, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 385, 408 (1931).
124. Gregory, The New Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia Act, 8 U. Cm:. L. REv. 503
(1941).
125. Id. at 512.
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flect no more than an unexpected turn in Justice Harlan's thinking
near the end of his distinguished career. 120 If so, his untimely depar-
ture from the Court only a year later may mean that we shall never
benefit from the full fruition of his thinking in this area. Perhaps,
however, these opinions reflect a more broadly based feeling within
the legal profession that the time has come for open acceptance of
a long-ignored method of legal reasoning. Justice Harlan's opinions
would seem more appropriately viewed in this latter context, as evi-
dence of the evolutionary development which Dean Pound recog-
nized as inevitable at the beginning of this century. Thus, further
development and refinement of this style of reasoning need not await
additional elaboration by the Supreme Court. The methodology is a
tool ready to be used by judge and advocate alike throughout our
legal system. Without it, the task of harmonizing and rationalizing
our system of law will remain insuperable.
126. In this context, it is interesting to note Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Griswold, where he refused to accept the penumbra concept of Justice Douglas. See note
45 supra. See also Professor Franklin's criticism of Justice Harlan's reasoning in Harper
v. Bd. of Elections, supra note 55.
